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A COMMENT ON:
“State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract”
by Timothy Besley
ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU
Economics Department, London Business School and CEPR
In this note, I discuss avenues for future research stemming from Besley’s [this is-
sue] theoretical approach on the interconnections between civicness, institutions, and
state-fiscal capacity. First, I lay down some ideas on how one could extend the frame-
work to model fragility traps that characterize many low-income countries and study
issues related to nation-building, conflict, and heterogeneity across space and ethnic
lines in the provision of public goods. Second, I discuss the relevance of the approach
for the analysis of authoritarian populism that is spreading in developed countries and
emerging markets.
KEYWORDS: Institutions, states, social capital, public goods, fractionalization, pop-
ulism.
1. INTRODUCTION
WHY DO STATES EMERGE? Why do states often consolidate, but sometimes disintegrate?
Why are some states fragmented, often with extractive institutions, while others appear
cohesive, with inclusive institutions? Such questions have baffled scholars since classical
times. Plato famously stressed the role of arête, civic virtue, in the ideal republic. Aris-
totle argued that each political system has a developmentist facet, where constitutions-
institutions serve the public interest, and a perverted facet, where not everyone benefits
from public goods. These ideas were reborn by the worldly philosophers of the Enlight-
enment, who were writing at a period of state formation and amalgamation.
As Besley (2020) puts it, one can distinguish between two extreme views of statehood.
On the one hand, the Hobbesian approach views the state as means of constraining peo-
ple’s worst atomism in their state of nature, what he coins as “Warre”; in turn, citizens place
constraints on the state Leviathan. Formal institutions, such as executive constraints, safe-
guards on property rights, and civil liberties are, therefore, sine qua non conditions for an
efficient state. On the other hand, John Locke (1690) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762)
take a social contract viewpoint where citizens pass some rights, such as the monopoly
of violence and the provision of pubic goods, to a benevolent government, accepting, in
turn, obligations. Efficient states emerge when citizens engage in politics, trust state insti-
tutions, and check the government.1 Civicness and social capital are therefore necessary.
Classical economists such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Joseph Schumpeter stressed
the interconnections between economics, politics, institutions, and trust. Nonetheless,
there was not much research on these issues for most of the 20th century. Neverthe-
less, there has been a notable reversal with an explosion of research in the past decades.
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A vibrant research agenda, in which Tim Besley is at the forefront, re-examines these in-
terrelationships using eloquent theoretical models, “reduced-form” and more structural
econometric approaches, often relying for identification on historical experiments.2
2. BESLEY (2019)
Tim Besley’s Presidential Address in the Econometric Society fits this research strand.
Drawing on work with Thorsten Persson, Besley (2020) develops a simple, yet rich, theo-
retical paradigm that stresses the complementarity between the cohesiveness of state in-
stitutions with civicness, modeled as quasi-voluntary tax compliance, where tax revenues
are used to fund public goods. Besley (2020) formalizes ideas found in Levi’s (1988) in-
fluential historical analysis on the evolution of taxation and statehood, as well as leading
political thinkers stressing the role of civic participation and social capital, such as Lipset
(1960) and Puttnam (1988), on institutional and economic development.
2.1. Model
Besley (2020) develops a model of intrinsic reciprocity where trust and values are in-
ternalized into agents’ preferences (Sobel (2005); see also Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)
and Tabellini (2008)). The elite decide on public-good provision or transfers; citizens pay
taxes that fund government expenditures. Citizens are either “virtuous,” deriving positive
utility from tax compliance, or “materialists.” Citizens’ utility is increasing in income and
the (observable) public good. Citizens decide the proportion of income to hide; tax com-
pliance is costly, as governments invest in detection. The elite set the income tax rate and
decide on whether to spend on the public good or transfer revenues to itself or the citizens.
Institutions constrain the share of government expenditure that the elite can appropriate.
Hence, tax compliance, states’ fiscal capacity, and public goods are endogenously deter-
mined, driven by the share of civic-minded citizens, detention costs, and executive con-
straints. In the dynamic setting, civicness evolves as citizens’ values and actions respond to
policies (public good provision or transfers), which in turn foster or dilute civicness. The
model yields multiple equilibria. When initial conditions are favorable (with constraints
on elites, costly tax avoidance, and a high share of civic-minded citizens), the elite choose
the public good, which further enhances civicness, sustaining the social contract, and en-
suring a “cultural fitness” of the virtuous citizens. In contrast, if institutions leave the elite
unconstrained or/and the society starts with a large fraction of materialist citizens, there
is public good under-provision, as government expenditure is tilted towards transfers (to
the elite or the citizens). There is also a tipping (unstable) equilibrium that shapes con-
vergence to the two polar steady states.
2.2. Implications
The model yields two intuitive implications. First, there are complementarities between
civicness and (cohesive) institutions, a theoretical result that is in line with cross-country
and regional correlations (e.g., Tabellini (2010), Alesina and Giuliano (2015)). Second,
the common interests of the elite and the polloi develop state capacity. Whether this re-
sults in public goods (and investments in fiscal capacity) or inefficient transfers depends
2On the role of civic virtue and social capital, see Algan and Cahuc (2014), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005),
and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011).
COMMENT 1353
on initial share of civic-minded citizens and institutions. There is not much empirical evi-
dence here; but this implication may explain why “external wars” cultivated state capacity
in Europe, but not in Latin America.
3. OPEN ISSUES
Space constraints prevent me from delving into the fascinating extensions and the
model assumptions. Thus, I turn to two core ideas that stem from the paper (as well as
previous work of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011)). The first relates to state fragility that
characterizes many low-income countries. The second regards the wave of authoritarian
populism that haunts high- (and middle-) income countries.
3.1. Fragile States
As Besley, Cameron, and Kaberuka stress in their Report on State Fragility, Growth, and
Development, low-income countries are subject to a fragility trap: underdevelopment re-
inforces civil conflict which in turn weakens state legitimacy and capacity, which further
buttress poverty (see also Migdal (1988)). State capacity has many origins, geographic,
historical, and economic, issues that Besley and Persson (2011) discuss in detail. In ad-
dition, ethnic fractionalization and polarization, as well as within- and between-ethnic-
group inequalities, seem to be fostering and sustaining civil conflict, under-provision of
public goods, and poverty (e.g., Esteban and Ray (2011), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005), Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016)).
Let me zoom in to Africa, where state capacity is weak: income taxation is almost ab-
sent, public goods provision is minimal, and many governments cannot monopolize vi-
olence. Case-studies, narratives, and econometric works suggest that as African states
failed to deliver and African elites siphoned state revenues to Swiss bank accounts, citi-
zens’ ethnic (and religious) identities strengthened. Though there is non-negligible varia-
tion across countries, Afrobarometer survey data suggest that around a third of the pop-
ulation identifies either solely or predominately with the ethnicity rather than the nation,
FIGURE 1.—National-ethnic institutions [settling disputes and land allocation]. Source Afrobarometer Sur-
veys Round 4; taken from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015).
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FIGURE 2.—State capacity and ethnic-nation identification. Source: Afrobarometer Surveys Rounds 3 and
4; taken from Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015).
with most Africans identifying equally with the nation and the ethnicity (Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2015)). Ethnicity is not just identity. Ethnic customary and for-
mal institutions are present, especially in the countryside, traditional authorities provide
public goods, and chiefs settle disputes and provide security. Figure 1(a)–(b) tabulate
Afrobarometer Survey data covering 16 Sub-Saharan African countries and show that
traditional ethnic leaders have significant power in allocating property and dealing with
disputes. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) and Baldwin (2016) present case evi-
dence on the role of chiefs and ethnic leaders in the provision of public goods in Sierra
Leone and Zambia, respectively, while Amodio, Chiovelli, and Hohmann (2019) present
pan-African evidence on the interplay of ethnic and national institutions and the delicate
relations between national politicians and local chiefs.
State capacity mirrors ethnic identification, a pattern that loosely speaking accords with
Besley’s model. As Figure 2 illustrates, institutional quality correlates with the share of the
population identifying with the nation as compared to ethnicity. It seems that in (parts of)
Africa, the “social contract” is between citizens and ethnic leaders, who, following deeply
rooted ethnic norms and institutions, provide basic public goods. Ethnic identification
and reliance on ethnic institutions and traditions both weaken state capacity and reflect
governments’ inability to provide basic public goods.
It would be interesting to expand the model, perhaps bringing in elements from Este-
ban and Ray’s (2008, 2011) classic work on civil conflict, allowing for multiple providers
of public goods (and taxation), and heterogeneity on public good preferences, perhaps
emerging from occupational specialization across groups. A related possible extension is
adding competition among groups for national resources, to think about ethnic favoritism,
which appears pervasive.
Another avenue is thinking about spatial heterogeneity in state capacity, public goods
provision, and reach of national institutions. Building on Herbst (2000), in Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2014) we show that the penetration of national institutions decays and
ethnic identification rises when one moves away from the capital. Effectively, the patterns
in Figure 1 have a spatial dimension, as segregation is quite high in Africa and it correlates
negatively with the quality of government (Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)).
A related avenue is thinking about top-down nation-building policies, issues that are im-
portant but under-researched (Bazzi, Gaduh, Rothenberg, and Wong (2019) is a notable
exception). As Figures 2(a)–(b) illustrate, ethnic identification among African countries
is the lowest in Tanzania, reflecting the nation-building policies of Julius Nyerere, who ex-
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plicitly tried to mute ethnic norms (see Miguel (2004)). This is important as many African
countries did not develop organically, being colonial artifacts, with peculiar sizes, hetero-
geneous geography, and straight borders splitting many ethnicities (e.g., Alesina, East-
erly, and Matuszeski (2011), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016)). As education is
expanding in the continent, it is thus important to understand its role in spurring national
identities, which in turn may allow African countries building state capacity.
3.2. On Populism
Besley (2020), being an optimist, argues (rightly in my view) that an indirect benefit
of democratization may be the cultivation of fiscal capacity and social/civic capital that
in turn helps consolidate representative institutions and promote growth. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2019) make similar points in their Narrow Corridor theory of liberty and devel-
opment. It may be interesting testing this conjecture that links democracy to democratic
beliefs in a before-after “control”–“treatment” setting, like the one in Acemoglu, Naidu,
Restrepo, and Robinson (2019) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), who document
positive within-country correlations between democratization and output (growth). How-
ever, the mirror image of Besley’s argument is that political instability and reversals to
autocracy can be particularly destabilizing, as they deplete societal civic capital.
Nowadays, many high-income countries with strong and inclusive institutions experi-
ence a surge of authoritarian populism (see Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) for a re-
view). Viewing populism through the lens of the Besley (2020) theory is alarming. First,
“populism undermines core institutions, while authoritarianism actively corrodes principles
and practices at the heart of liberal democracy” (see Norris and Inglehart (2018)). Second,
there is a significant rise of distrust to government, political parties, courts, and other
core institutions of modern capitalist democracies, aspects that relate to nationalism and
(especially) far-right populism (e.g., Algan, Guriev, Passari, and Papaioannou (2018)).
Besley (2020) reports some individual-level regression results on this using World Value
Survey data. Figure 3(a)–(b) illustrate a similar pattern across European regions. The
figures plot before-after crisis changes in the voting share of anti-establishment, mostly
populist parties (as classified by political scientists who go over party manifestos), against
trust in the political and the legal system, as recorded by the European Social Surveys.
These correlations do not imply necessarily a causal effect; and many recent papers link
both distrust and populism to secular shocks, like trade and automation, or the recent cri-
sis (e.g., Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2019), Frey, Berger, and Chen (2019), Algan
et al. (2018), Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli (2019)).
Besley’s model suggests that this drop in trust/civicness and/or the accompanying “at-
tack on institutions” by populist leaders reinforce each other. If the shock is large enough
then the society may quickly move from the pro-development steady state, with cohesive
institutions, public goods provision, high state capacity, and civic-minded citizens, to the
low-development one. While many argue that industrial Western countries are far from
this “tipping point,” this is not necessarily the case for middle-income economies with
moderate levels of fiscal capacity and intermediate levels of executive constraints and so-
cial capital, like Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. It is thus worthwhile extending the model
to think more carefully about these issues.
4. CONCLUSION
Besley (2020) and Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) have developed an elegant theo-
retical paradigm to think about the origins and interconnections of institutional quality,
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(a)
(b)
FIGURE 3.—(a) Populism vote and political trust across European regions. (b) Populism vote and legal
system trust across European regions. Source: Voting Records & European Social Surveys.
fiscal capacity, public goods provision, and development. This work has formalized im-
portant insights in social sciences and allowed for deeper thinking of some of the most
fundamental issues in social sciences. Nonetheless, more work is needed, as many issues
are still open. First, research on civicness and social capital has mostly identified their
long-run historical and geographic origins; there is not much work on the role of specific
policies and interventions (see, e.g., Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2013) on the role of edu-
cation system practices). Second, quasi-experimental studies should tease out the impact
of institutional shocks on civicness and vice versa. Third, more micro work is needed to
understand the vertical and horizontal transmission of formal and informal rules. Fourth,
policy impact studies (and perhaps randomized control trials) should explore the role
of the underlying cultural norms and institutions in the efficacy of reforms and targeted
interventions.
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